The crying need of the Ukrainians was for consumer goods. Odesa and Kharkiv requested that they might be given the power to build textile mills to supply the needs of the local population. The request was denied, for the authorities had decided that the textile industry was to be concentrated in the RSFSR. The iron and steel cities requested that they might be given the permission to build factories to complete the fabrication of certain delicate types of machinery. The request was refused because it was to be only in the Moscow area that such articles were to be made. It was to be the task of Ukraine to furnish the raw material, the iron ore from Kryvy Rih, the coal of the Donbas, and to prepare the semi-finished pig-iron and other forms of semi-fabricated material that were needed by the central plants.

The plan not only provided for construction. It went even further and specified the exact amount of products that were to be turned out by each individual plant. While it was possible to secure some profits from the over-fulfillment of the plan, regardless of the effect that this might have upon the plan as a whole, any under-fulfillment was treated as a gross failure of obligation to the state.

This led, in turn, to additional restrictions on the freedom of the workers. Punishments were ordered for tardiness, for absence from employment even for a single day without a satisfactory reason, for an attempt to change the place of employment. These regulations were not the product of the governing bodies of the republics but of the Union authorities themselves and they were transmitted from Moscow to the national republics through the liaison between the All-Union commissariats and their subordinate organs.

It was the same with agriculture. Moscow knew what each collective farm, each kolkhoz, each sovkhoz was to furnish, and woe to the group that failed. The famine had been the result and that had been used to break the spirit of resistance of the Ukrainian villagers. The government specified the acreage that was to be devoted to wheat, to barley, to all of the crops that could be raised and it did no good if the local agronomists pointed out new

727 Inasmuch as all the land was organized in collective farms and the
661 title to these rested in the Soviet government, they as conquerors
[241] merely took over the land of their defeated rivals. They continued the same kind of collectivized agriculture, since it brought them the greatest advantages and they had no intention of doing anything for the Ukrainian population. Koch made it clear that the Ukrainians had no rights that the Germans were bound to respect. Their property was not theirs but it was reserved for Germans and once the system was in the saddle, as shown by Koch's Twelve Commandments for the regulation of the relations of the two peoples, he did everything to destroy completely the Ukrainian intellectual life.

[538] By the winter of 1941-2, the Germans in Kiev were executing
● [466] Ukrainian writers as O. Teliha and Dr. Oleh Kandyba-Olzhych, who were accused of plotting against the new masters. Soon there began extensive deportations of Ukrainians to Germany for slave labor and the number of victims from the ranks of the cooperatives rapidly grew.

668 These German actions naturally roused the Ukrainians to a more vigorous opposition and resulted in the formation of numerous armed bands which, from secure hiding places in the forests and swamps, raided German convoys and at times extended their open control over large areas of the country. Among the first of these bands to appear was that of the Polyssian Sich under the command of Taras Bulba—Borovets which operated in Polissya and Volynia. Other significant and important movements were started by the followers of Bandera (the so-called Banderivtsy) and of Melnyk. Yet these groups were not alone for almost spontaneously there sprang up many other local units, all interested in the same goal of Ukrainian independence. Some of these units were organized primarily to fight against Soviet irregulars. Others had seen from the beginning their most dangerous foe as the Germans but whatever their origin, the overbearing brutality of the Germans swung these groups to a determined warfare against them.

668 This process continued during most of 1942 with the Ukrainian
725 forces taking over more and more control from the Germans,

722 In the same way, the authorities gathered up in frenzied haste machinery, finished products, and records and started them likewise to the east with the hope of setting them up somewhere in a safe place and using them to increase the Soviet war potential. All this was a hurried and confused process, for it was contradicted by the Soviet orders to reduce the Ukraine to a heap of ruins and to leave nothing available for the invaders.

[814] [661] The clash between these two ideas was vividly reflected in the destruction of Kiev. Some sections of the Academy of Sciences of the UkSSR were hurriedly packed on trains and moved to Ufa. Other sections for little better reasons were abandoned in the general confusion or were mined for immediate destruction. Priceless books and records, no less than boilers and lathes, shared the two fates, while Kiev, thoroughly mined, was exploded and set on fire without regard for the needs of the people. The Soviet authorities, well aware that they could not evacuate the entire population, destroyed the food supplies of those who were left behind while other detachments massacred the helpless population indiscriminately.

The situation at Kharkiv and Odesa was far better and far more logical for the Soviets had a few days longer to sort out what they wished to remove and what they wanted to destroy, but even in these places there was the same wanton destruction which conflicted with the avowed aims of the Soviet authorities.

Then ensued a series of mutual recriminations, and it is still not clear in regard to many buildings and institutions whether the bulk of the damage and the losses were caused by Nazi or by Communist actions. Some 3500 carloads of machinery were shipped alone from the city of Zaporyzhzhya and most of this material was packed at night in utter darkness with no special care as to where it was being sent.

[466] The same situation confronted the workers, some 5,000,000 of whom were evacuated from the Ukraine and landed in rough factories that were hastily erected somewhere in Asia. These sometimes lacked even roofs and means of heating when the mercury dropped to 45° below zero.

their posts and the vast majority of those who were Communists received more or less sinecures above ground. Their places were taken by forcing the Ukrainian peasants, including a large percentage of young girls, to work in the pits with the minimum of safeguards. Little money was appropriated for the restoration of the damaged housing, for as the writer Korniychuk declared in one of his works, "Ukraine was so thankful for the success of Stalin that they did not care how they lived, for if he had perished, life would not be worth living under any circumstances."

With this attitude prominently emphasized by the leading propagandists, it is easy to see that the resources and energies of the population were directed by force rather toward those items that would advance the importance and the convenience of Moscow, than those that would be of advantage to the local population.

The one exception was the necessity for rebuilding immediately and strengthening the railroad communications between the Donbas, Moscow, Leningrad and the Black Sea ports—in other words, the extreme eastern part of the Ukraine which was slated for a special development with roads and railroads linking the country up with the Russian centres rather than with the other Ukrainian centres to the west for these were regarded as exposed centres in case of a new outbreak of hostilities and were to be neglected until they were masked by the extension of Soviet power over the satellite countries.

The collectivized agriculture was in little better shape. In that part of the Ukraine which had been under Soviet control before 1939, the authorities revived the collective farms but they had been so badly ruined that at first the authorities were often willing to be more considerate of the members. Immediately after the war they allowed them to group themselves into links or permanent sections of some eight to ten people who would thus come to feel themselves a distinct unit in the collective farm. It did not take long for the more rigid Communists to decide that this sense of permanence was in a way a defiance of the principles of collectivization, for very often members of the same household, if it were at all numerous, would group themselves into a link. In such cases the link became more prosperous, for it was in a way

a revival of that form of family agriculture which had long been popular in the Ukraine before the collectivization. Furthermore, it was soon suspected that the links varied in their delivery of supplies to the government, sometimes in inverse proportion to their own readiness to work. The peasants likewise as in the early days of the NEP devoted more attention to their own private plots of land, a phenomenon that had been noticed even before World War II. 474 241

The Soviet authorities had several answers to such developments. On the one hand, they finally forbade the operation of the permanent links which had developed to the point where they threatened the objective of collectivization, the turning of the peasant farmer into a paid proletarian worker in agriculture. On the other hand they reduced the size again of the individual plot of land and they forced the peasants to give up animal raising on their plots by charging them for even the straw from the collective farms and the wild fodder that grew in abandoned places. Then again, they levied a tax on the products of these plots and this, plus the reduction of the allotment, rendered it impossible for the peasant to improve his lot except through increased work on the collective farm. In the meanwhile the steady raising of the quota of work required for one labor day made it impossible for the average peasant, unless he was a Stakhanovist (i.e. a person who cooperated with the central regime and thereby received favorable assignments) to complete one labor day within one calendar day, no matter how long hours he worked. This had been a favorite device of the Russian landlords as we learn from Radishchev's *Journey from Petersburg to Moscow*, a famous Russian radical work of the end of the eighteenth century but a modern version of it was adapted by the Russian Communist leaders and used effectively. 474 241 466● [423]

Even these measures were not the desirable solution. This was first proposed by Khrushchov in 1947, and while it was at first looked upon with some disfavor, it was finally deemed suitable by the slave-drivers of the Kremlin, and Khrushchov, after a period of mild disfavor, was promoted to the Politburo, and another Russian, Melnikov, placed in charge of Ukraine. This was the 474 241 665

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decrease of popular support for Germany in the Ukraine. There is good evidence that the population was at first sympathetic to the German efforts to recruit labor voluntarily.[70] Moreover, a large number of nationalist Ukrainians supported the measure; they not only wanted to help Germany win the war against the Soviet Union, but believed that it would be a valuable cultural experience for young Ukrainians to come into contact with advanced German technology and with Western European culture in general. To them it was means of drawing the Ukrainian nation away from its too-close association with the Russians and the "Asiatics" of their empire and of establishing a European orientation for their country.[71]

Unhappily for these visions, the methods used by the Germans in dealing with the volunteer workers soon dried up the supply. They were frequently given miserable transportation and poor accommodations on arrival in Germany. Highly trained workers and professional men who had volunteered in order to increase their technical ability by experience in Germany were assigned to common labor.[72] Most important, however, the Ukrainians, like other *Ostarbeiter,* were forced to wear a humiliating badge distinguishing them from Western Europeans; they were forbidden social contacts with the latter and, in order to implement this decree, were excluded from motion-picture theaters, restaurants, and other public places. The erstwhile willing worker felt that the Germans regarded him (as many did) as nothing but a Bolshevik prisoner.[73]

When this policy of segregation resulted in lack of volunteers, force was used; mandatory labor service for young men and women was officially introduced in the Reichskommissariat on September 21, 1942,[74] but in practice compulsion had long been employed. In reply to the inevitable evasion of this order, the most demoralizing of tricks—such as seizure of worshippers at

[70] Report of the representative of the Reichsministerium für die besetzten Ostgebiete in Heeresgebiet B, First Lieutenant Theurer, October 7, 1942, PS 054 (hereafter referred to as PS 054).

[71] E.g., *Krakivs'ki Visti,* February 6, 1942, p. 2.

[72] PS 054.

[73] Opinion report for period June 12–July 14, 1942, Auslandbriefprüfstelle, Gruppe VIII, PS 302 (hereafter referred to as PS 302).

[74] *Deutsche Ukraine Zeitung,* September 22, 1942, p. 3.

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church services and invitations by German authorities to theatrical performances at which all were arrested—were utilized. Force and brutal retaliation, such as burning of villages from which the potential workers ran away, were frequently applied.[75] The conscripts were sent a thousand miles to Germany in unheated cattle cars, sealed with barbed wire. Still worse, there was no just selection of those most suited for departure, no systematic registration.[76] Mothers of small children were sometimes taken; sons and husbands who were the only support of their families were conscripted without adequate provision for the families' maintenance.[77]

The horror of such treatment was perhaps the single most important cause of popular revulsion against the Germans. In addition to all its material hardships, the mere idea of forced transportation to a distant and unknown land recalled the generations-old terror of banishment to Siberia.[78] The extent of the program was so enormous that every family was touched; it became a universal evil. Of the total population of Kiev, thirty-eight thousand persons (over 10 percent) were delivered to the *Ostarbeiter* program within the first ten months of German occupation.[79] In the southern *Generalbezirke* somewhat smaller numbers appear to have been involved[80] but in the crucial *Bezirk* of Zhitomir, one hundred and seventy thousand (about 6 percent of the population) were taken by mid-1943, and thirty thousand more were to follow.[81] In all, as early as August, 1943, one out of every forty inhabitants of the Ukraine had been deported to Germany as forced laborers,[82] and by the end of the occupation the number of

[75] Auslandbriefprüfstelle, report for September 11–November 11, 1942, PS 018 (hereafter referred to as PS 018).

[76] Landesbauernführer Körner, Die neue deutsche Ukraine-Politik, PS 1198 (hereafter referred to as PS 1198).

[77] Occ E-4 (1); PS 054.

[78] Oral report of Generalkommissar Leyser (Zhitomir) to Rosenberg, June 17, 1943, PS 265 (hereafter referred to as PS 265).

[79] Commander of the SP and the SS, Kiev, to Commander of the SP and the SS, Ukraine, July 20, 1942, NO 1603 (hereafter referred to as NO 1603).

[80] Only about 1 percent from *Generalbezirk* Nikolaev by mid-1942 (Conference of Sauckel and Reichskommissariat officials in Kiev, August 12, 1942, NO 1606; hereafter referred to as NO 1606).

[81] PS 265.

[82] According to Sauckel, director of the *Ostarbeiter* program, at a Führer Conference, August 20, 1943, NO 1831 (hereafter referred to as NO 1831).

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Ukrainian workers in Germany totaled one and one-half million.[83]

The suffering caused by the actions of the Germans described above did not directly affect the activity of the nationalist elements, as did their repressive attitude toward education, religion, culture, and local administration. Indirectly, however, it played an enormous part in the development of the nationalist movements in the East Ukraine during the German occupation. One effect was a general subordination of all thought, all activity, to the demands of self-preservation. The constant struggle to keep alive resulted in a reduction of the energy and attention which could be devoted to all political questions, including nationalism. On the other hand, the sheer impossibility of coming to terms with the German authority, regardless of how ready one might be to sacrifice all independence to do so, led many to seek a political movement which promised deliverance. A vast number, of course, turned back to Communism, hoping that the experience of near-defeat would lead to a modification of Moscow's policies. For others, however, the only rational solution appeared to be the nationalist parties.

Weak as they were after the waves of suppressions during the six months from September, 1941, to February, 1942, the two OUN groups endeavored to meet this challenge. Of the two factions, the Bandera group appears to have made the easiest, but not the most thorough-going adjustment. Its ability to adjust at a rather shallow level was due to several factors. The members of the OUN-B were nearly all young, and their movement placed little emphasis on systematic ideology. When they went to the East Ukraine, they carried a large number of slogans and romantic pledges as baggage.[84] These either attracted or antagonized

[83] PS 1198.

[84] One of these oaths, as discovered by the German police, reads:

"On my honor, for the fame of the fallen heroes, for the holy blood spilled, for my Ukrainian earth and the majesty of my Ukrainian homeland, I swear that I will struggle with all my strength and with my life for a free and Ukrainian state. With my heart, my soul, and my whole being I confess that only the Ukrainian revolution can give power to the Ukrainian state and the people. Unto death I will stand on the battlefield in order to build a national Ukrainian State. No one and nothing at all can hold me back from the path of the Ukrainian national revolution, neither difficulties nor death. I will carry out every command of my leader. I swear on the Ukraine, that I will loyally and honestly carry out

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874 that number of inhabitants, had 541 students in its medi-
727 cal school.[37] Medical institutes were also reopened in Stalino,
186 Dniepropetrovsk, and Vinnitsa, and perhaps in other cities, although it is doubtful if any of these were the centers of nationalist youth organization which the faculty in Kiev became under the leadership of the OUN-M.[38]

The educational structure described in the preceding paragraph was designed for adolescents or young adults, and thus could be used for direct propagation of nationalist concepts. It was, of course, partly for this reason that the Germans confined advanced training within such narrow limits. Even these restrictions were not the end of the difficulties faced in inculcating a nationalist type of education in those about to assume the role of citizens,
● [446] for the technical schools were frequently emptied of their students and faculty to meet the demands of the *Ostarbeiter* recruiters. The elementary schools were also drained of teachers by the *Ostarbeiter* program, and the pupils, though too young for forced labor, were decimated by famine and plague. If the task of building national consciousness had to be viewed as a long-term one, then the four-year elementary school offered a considerable field for cultivation.[39]

191 The problem confronting the nationalist leaders in education
727 was twofold: they had to ensure a basis for the development of
872 an independent Ukraine by making certain that all instruction
186 was in the Ukrainian language, so that the rising generation would be fully at home in this speech; and they had to replace the Communist ideology by a positive nationalist concept. The first task was relatively uncomplicated, though far from easy in practice. In line with their policy of encouraging the purely nonpolitical aspects of Ukrainian nationality, the Germans ordered all instruction to be in Ukrainian. The nationalist directors enthusiastically supported this rule, but it was sometimes difficult to enforce it, since even teachers who were themselves nationalist in sentiment were not always able to conduct classes in Ukrainian.[40]

[37] Occ E-4 (1); *Ukrains'ka Diisnist'*, October 10, 1942, p. 1.
[38] See Chapter V.
[39] In Kiev alone there were fifty elementary schools with 17,000 students (*Krakivs'ki Visti*, April 11, 1942, p. 2).
[40] Tarkovych in *Krakivs'ki Visti*, July 12, 1942, p. 4; M. Prykhod'ko in *Krakivs'ki*

727 661 "The course of ruthless brutality in treating the inhabitants of the country by principles and methods used in past centuries against coloured slave peoples, and the fact sneering at every sound policy that the disregard of this nation found its expression not only in the treatment of the people but was expressed at every possible and impossible opportunity again and again and was in addition printed and published in pamphlets, is a proof of the complete lack of instinct in handling of foreign peoples, which, with regard to its consequences, cannot be called other than shocking and catastrophic".

Frauenfeld shows this 'policy with the blacksmith's hammer' which would not see the inevitable reaction of the Ukrainians on such barbarism:

"There must be a naivety bordering on narrow-mindedness to believe that in the 20th century a nation having a shocking tragic history but, however, having a historical past, even if it is of another breed than the German people, — undoubtedfully has certain qualities of race and character, will permit itself to be degraded and insulted permanently and will also delightedly place its working power and capacities at the service of the tyrant".

Frauenfeld quotes the words of the Reichskommissar Erich Koch, who during a journey from Rivne (Rovno) to Kiev said to his staff:

"If I should find a Ukrainian worthy to sit with me at one table I must shoot him".

Frauenfeld cites examples from the work of the German administration headed by Erich Koch: the closing of schools, theatres, libraries, inattentiveness to epidemics among the Ukrainians, deliberate furtherance of the dying out of the Ukrainian people. As Frauenfeld witnesses, his collegues were very satisfied with the spreading of epidemics in Ukraine: "The Ukrainian needs no physicians; if an epidemic breaks out, thousands and tens of thousands will perish".

● 466 727 661 For the needs of the German economy the German Nazi Government took working power from Ukraine. Frauenfeld writes about this:

"There was, for instance, the enlisting for work in Germany. That was carried out in a way that bears close comparison with the Bolshevik deportations to Siberia. From camps surrounded by barbed wire, from grated waggons to the encircling and searching of villages by surprise, and nocturnal levying in which people were taken in GPU manner out of their beds, the whole technique of the Arab slave hunters among the negroes of Africa in past centuries was used".

464 districts through the long winter has led to the creation of a large class who migrate according to the season, working for wages on the land in summer and moving to the towns in search of work in winter. A slight permanent movement to the towns is in progress, but the rate is not rapid. As the Little Russians are not naturally energetic or industrious, the supply of labour for industries other than agriculture is not equal to the demand, and immigration from other parts of Russia is continuous. The heavier classes of work in the industries of the Donets and Krivoy-Rog regions are seldom undertaken by the natives of the country. The underground labour of the mines and the foundry work is done mainly by Great Russians, who come from the Governments of Smolensk, Orel, Kursk, Mohilev, and Simbirsk. The port labour at Odessa and Nikolaev has attracted a population of mixed nationality with a low standard of living, who exist between seasons in a state of semi-starvation.

464 221 In the agricultural world labour is fairly plentiful, but the neglect to cultivate such lands as are not suitable for cereals has led to a summer immigration of Bulgarians, who raise fine crops of vegetables and ground fruits on low-lying land, supplying not only the neighbourhood but far distant towns. These immigrants return home in winter.

167 There is no great permanent emigration from the Ukraine except among the population in the region of the upper Dnieper, a fair number of whom leave for the Polish industrial districts owing to bad conditions at home.

(b) *Labour Conditions*

466 511 565 Labour conditions cannot be called good in any branch of industry. The State makes no effort to regularize the supply and very little to better the conditions of labour. The landless agricultural proletariat, which is increasing steadily, lives in a hand-to-mouth fashion, and its position is gradually growing worse. Lacking energy and ability, individuals of

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this class are often compelled to accept badly-paid work in the towns, and both men and women have often to make long and laborious journeys on foot in search of employment. 466 511 565

A large class engaged in domestic industries, whether as masters or as servants, make a very poor living, frequently working very long hours under bad sanitary conditions.

In the coal and iron industries there are some concerns, particularly those capitalized from abroad, which look well after their work-people, provide housing, secure good supplies of provisions at moderate prices, and take other measures to ameliorate labour conditions. In consequence, however, of works and mines being often situated on land rented on short-term leases, many employers cannot afford to lay out money on such objects, and conditions for labour are generally bad. So difficult is it to attract labour, that mine-owners have sometimes sought to secure convict labour from the Government. 466

The peculiar characteristic of labour in the Ukraine is its mobility, which often occasions unexpected crises. Superstition, epidemics of disease, and more obscure causes lead to vast movements of labourers from a district at very short notice. 166 464

The *artels*, which are labour organizations peculiar to Russia, have an important influence on the supply and quality of certain labour. An *artel* is an association of workers, the general principles of which are: (1) all members must be actual workers; (2) all have equal rights in the organization; and (3) every member is responsible for the obligations contracted by the *artel*. The organization is usually non-capitalistic or has a very small capital. 467

In general there are two classes of *artels*, those of workers in producing trades and those of workers who provide service. The former are engaged in carpentering, cabinet-making, printing, linen-weaving, dairy-work, fishing, &c. The second group comprises stevedores, packers, customs agents, bank porters, com-

quality. For this the worker, if he does not spend any kopeks for food and housing, must work one and one-half months, and two months for the cheapest winter coat. Three colored shirts eat up a month's wages. For the same amount he could buy his wife three summer dresses of poor quality or three sets of underwear or three blouses. (129)

129. Statement of a German specialist in Kiyev.

Far too often the life of the Soviet Ukraine worker is exhausted in the struggle for his daily bread, for clothing and shelter, and yet before the war he was the best paid in Russia. Undoubtedly the Bolsheviks have done a great deal of building, but they neglected the building of houses in favor of the building of clubhouses and palaces for cultural purposes, veritable giant structures of cement and steel where in the evening the locksmiths and metal founders then assemble "in order to hear lectures on Shakespeare". "For in human history there is an urge that has never before been recognized in the great masses...for art and literature. The famous tractor brigade of the Pasha Angelin comes forth with songs, and the workers of the Khar'kov tractor factory organize their own opera. Hundreds of groups of worker and kolhosp newspapers flaunt poems, stories and essays written by forge and tractor workers."

He whose thoughts take flight on the wings of Pegasus will find his hands only mechanically at work. Among the construction workers the "never-before recognized urge of the great masses...for art and literature" expresses itself in the following way, according to Pravda of July 16, 1937: "The brick production program for the year could only be 19 percent accomplished in the first five months of the year, and the two subsequent months have also brought no change. The construct-

[Ukrainian Constitution as of Nov. 21, 1949]

695 Art. 91. In all courts of the Ukrainian SSR cases are heard in public, unless otherwise provided for by law, and the accused is guaranteed the right to be defended by counsel.

693 Art. 92. Judges are independent and subject only to the law.

Art. 93. Supreme supervisory power to ensure the strict observance of the law by all Ministries and institutions subordinated to them, as well as by officials and citizens within the territory of the Ukrainian SSR generally, is exercised by the Procurator-General of the USSR directly and also through the Procurator of the Ukrainian SSR.

Art. 94. The Procurator of the Ukrainian SSR is appointed by the Procurator-General of the USSR for a term of five years.

Art. 95. Regional procurators are appointed by the Procurator-General of the USSR for a term of five years.

Art. 96. Area, district and city procurators are appointed by the Procurator of the Ukrainian SSR, subject to the approval of the Procurator-General of the USSR, for a term of five years.

Art. 97. The organs of the Procurator's Office perform their functions independently of any local organs whatsoever, being subordinate solely to the Procurator-General of the USSR.

Chapter VIII. Fundamental Rights and Duties of Citizens

641 Art. 98. Citizens of the Ukrainian SSR have the right to work, that is, are
461 guaranteed the right to employment and payment for their work in accordance with its quantity and quality.

The right to work is ensured by the socialist organization of the national economy, the steady growth of the productive forces of Soviet society, the elimination of the possibility of economic crises and the abolition of unemployment.

Art. 99. Citizens of the Ukrainian SSR have the right to rest and leisure.

The right to rest and leisure is ensured by the fixing of the working
●[466] day for factory and office workers at eight hours and the reduction of the working day to seven or six hours for arduous trades and to four hours in workshops where conditions of work are exceptionally arduous; by the institution of annual vacations with full pay for factory and office workers; and by the provision of a wide network of sanatoria, rest-homes and clubs for the accommodation of the working people.

641 Art. 100. Citizens of the Ukrainian SSR have the right to maintenance in old
657 age and also in case of sickness or disability.

This right is ensured by the extensive development of social insurance of factory and office workers at State expense, free medical service for the working people, and the provision of a wide network of health resorts for the use of the working people.

871 Art. 101. Citizens of the Ukrainian SSR have the right to education.
641 This right is ensured by universal compulsory elementary education; by free education up to and including the seventh grade; by the system of State stipends to students who have distinguished themselves in higher educational establishments; by instruction in schools being conducted in the native language; and by the organization in the factories, State farms and machine and tractor stations and collective farms of free vocational, technical and agronomic training for the working people.